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Relations among questionnaire and
experience sampling measures of
inner speech: a smartphone app
study
Ben Alderson-Day* and Charles Fernyhough
Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, UK
Inner speech is often reported to be a common and central part of inner experience,
but its true prevalence is unclear. Many questionnaire-based measures appear to lack
convergent validity and it has been claimed that they overestimate inner speech in
comparison to experience sampling methods (which involve collecting data at random
timepoints). The present study compared self-reporting of inner speech collected via
a general questionnaire and experience sampling, using data from a custom-made
smartphone app (Inner Life). Fifty-one university students completed a generalized
self-report measure of inner speech (the Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire,
VISQ) and responded to at least seven random alerts to report on incidences of
inner speech over a 2-week period. Correlations and pairwise comparisons were
used to compare generalized endorsements and randomly sampled scores for each
VISQ subscale. Significant correlations were observed between general and randomly
sampled measures for only two of the four VISQ subscales, and endorsements of
inner speech with evaluative or motivational characteristics did not correlate at all
across different measures. Endorsement of inner speech items was significantly lower
for random sampling compared to generalized self-report, for all VISQ subscales.
Exploratory analysis indicated that specific inner speech characteristics were also
related to anxiety and future-oriented thinking.
Keywords: covert speech, dialog, introspection, verbal thinking, self-talk
Introduction
“Human beings talk to themselves every moment of the waking day” (Baars, 2003, p. 106)
Inner speech—talking to oneself silently and internally—seems to be a central part of conscious
experience. Cognitive and developmental research on inner speech has led to it being associ-
ated with a variety of activities and skills, including problem-solving, memory, and self-reﬂection
(Sokolov, 1975; Morin, 2005; Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014). Less information exists, however, on
the extent and nature of everyday inner speech use, in part because of methodological diﬃculties
in measuring the phenomenon reliably.
Studies seeking to empirically investigate inner speech have tended to use generalized self-report
methods, such as “thought-listing,” diaries, or questionnaires. For example, Morin et al. (2011)
asked a sample of 380 university students to list, in an open format, “as many verbalizations as
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they typically address to themselves.” They then coded responses
for their content (such as positive or negative statements, or com-
ments about other people) and their apparent function (such
as self-regulation). By far the most common kind of content
reported was self-talk about oneself, including statements relating
to self-evaluation and utterances concerning emotions, personal
relationships, and physical appearance. In terms of functions,
inner speech was most commonly used for planning ahead,
remembering previous events, and motivating behavior. These
ﬁndings were consistent with a diary-based study of future-
thinking by D’Argembeau et al. (2011): participants were asked
to list a selection of thoughts each day, and rate their content
and phenomenological qualities, including whether they were
in inner speech or in other modalities (such as visual imagery).
Compared to other modalities, inner speech was particularly
associated with planning and decision-making. In addition, inner
speech was more likely to occur for negative or neutral thoughts
than positive thoughts.
Broadly similar results have been provided by questionnaire-
based studies of inner speech and private speech (i.e., speech
which is external but self-directed). Duncan and Cheyne (1999)
developed a questionnaire to study self-verbalizations (a mix-
ture of private and inner speech) and examined the most
common factors that arose in students. Overall, verbaliza-
tions were most often used for “cognitive-attentional” activ-
ities (i.e., trying to remember something, or avoid distrac-
tions) and organizing behavior, such as planning out a series
of actions. Brinthaupt et al.’s (2009) Self-Talk Scale (STS)
is a measure that emphasizes inner speech more speciﬁ-
cally, and includes four main factors: social assessment, self-
reinforcement, self-criticism, and self-management. Across a
series of experiments, they showed that individual diﬀerences
in self-talk frequency related to various cognitive, behavioral,
and mood factors. For instance, those who reported more fre-
quent instances of critical or evaluative self-talk also reported
lower self-esteem and a greater number of automatic negative
thoughts.
Most recently, McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough (2011)
devised the Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire (VISQ). The
VISQ asks about variations in inner speech that reﬂect its puta-
tive origin in external communication (Vygotsky, 1987), whereby
silent or covert self-talk reﬂects an internalized and transformed
version of outer dialog and social interaction. Thus, it asks about
inner speech that varies in structure (such as being in full sen-
tences, or single words, or having a turn-taking quality), identity
(such as involving interaction with other people), and, consistent
with other scales, self-regulatory behaviors (such as encourag-
ing or criticizing oneself). McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough’s
(2011) initial use of the scale displayed a four-factor structure,
encompassing dialogic inner speech (inner speech with a con-
versational quality), evaluative/motivational inner speech (i.e.,
self-regulatory inner speech), other people in inner speech (e.g.,
comments from other agents, such as relatives), and condensed
inner speech (the extent to which inner speech was abbrevi-
ated in some way). They found that dialog-like and evaluative
characteristics of inner speech were very common (endorsed by
75–80% of participants), while the presence of other people in
inner speech and condensed inner speech also appeared in a
substantial minority of individuals. Moreover, the diﬀerent char-
acteristics of inner speech were speciﬁcally related to diﬀering
aspects of psychopathology: for instance, McCarthy-Jones and
Fernyhough (2011) observed that inner speech containing other
people or evaluative characteristics was related to self-reported
scores for anxiety, while a separate study by Alderson-Day et al.
(2014) found that evaluative inner speech was also associated
with lower self-esteem. Taken together, the above studies point to
an experience of everyday inner speech that often involves self-
evaluation and thinking about the future, but can sometimes be
associated with low mood and feelings of anxiety.
However, the validity of investigating inner speech in this
way—that is, relying on participants’ generalized self-reports—
has been questioned. Using the same sample as Morin et al.
(2011), Uttl et al. (2011) assessed the reliability and validity statis-
tics of their own self-report method, along with Duncan and
Cheyne’s (1999) Self-Verbalization Questionnaire, Brinthaupt
et al.’s (2009) STS, and two other self-talk measures: the Inner
Speech Scale (ISS; Siegrist, 1995) and the Self-Talk Inventory
(Calvete et al., 2005). While all of the scales showed good internal
reliability, they showed very little convergent validity (with only
the STS and ISS being more than weakly correlated) and tended
not to correlate at all with the inner speech reports collected by
Morin et al. (2011). That is, what people freely list as generally
occurring in their inner speech, and how they respond to vari-
ous general questionnaires about the same topic, did not seem to
closely correspond.
A second, related cause for concern is the possibility that indi-
viduals may over-estimate their own inner speech when they
are asked about it in generalized terms. While some older stud-
ies have claimed very high frequency rates for inner speech, i.e.,
>50% of daily samples (Klinger and Cox, 1987; Goldstein and
Kenen, 1988), it has recently been suggested that inner speech
is far from ubiquitous and universal. Based on their studies
with Descriptive Experience Sampling—a method where par-
ticipants are prompted at random by a beeper to record their
everyday inner experience, and are then interviewed about that
experience in depth—Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) argued that
inner speech only occurs in 26% of random samples. Hurlburt
et al. (2013) suggest that inner speech questionnaires over-
estimate the occurrence of inner speech because they ask par-
ticipants to provide a general estimate of its occurrence, which
is more likely to reﬂect participants’ preconceptions about their
inner speech rather than its actual presence on a moment-by-
moment basis. Hurlburt et al.’s (2013) view is supported by
evidence from ecological momentary assessment studies, which
have often reported over-estimation of traits and behaviors when
they are gathered via generalized self-report compared to ran-
dom or momentary sampling (see Shiﬀman et al., 2008, for
a review).
As has been noted elsewhere (McCarthy-Jones and
Fernyhough, 2011; Morin et al., 2011), new and alternative meth-
ods are needed to fully assess whether generalized self-report
measures of inner speech can be reliable and valid indicators of
everyday inner speech (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2014).
One way to do that is to combine questionnaire methods with
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experience sampling (Csikszentmihalyi and Larson, 1987), in
which participants are prompted at random intervals to provide
data. DES as used by Hurlburt et al. (2013) is one kind of in-
depth experience sampling, but it is very resource-intensive and
typically only used in small groups of participants. An alternative
option is to use smartphone-based assessments to gather large
amounts of randomly sampled data. Experience sampling via
iPhones and other devices has previously been used successfully
to examine the relations between mood and mind-wandering
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). In some cases, such methods
have also been reported to change participants’ self-reporting
skills (a phenomenon known as ‘reactivity’): for instance, Runyan
et al. (2013) observed increased levels of self-awareness and bet-
ter time management in a group of university students who were
assigned to use an experience sampling app (iHabit) compared
to controls who simply completed general questionnaires.
We applied the smartphone app methodology to the study of
inner speech using a custom-made app, Inner Life. Inner Life
works by prompting participants at random, twice a day, to
answer a short series of questions about their ongoing thoughts,
feelings, and behavior. Speciﬁcally, volunteers are asked to indi-
cate what they were doing immediately prior to noticing the
alert from the app. In the present study they did this for
2 weeks, building up a maximum of 28 data points for various
aspects of inner life, including inner speech, activity, mood, and
mind-wandering.
In addition, we asked participants to complete a general-
ized measure of inner speech—the VISQ (McCarthy-Jones and
Fernyhough, 2011)—at the start and end of the two-week period.
The VISQ was chosen for the following reasons: (1) it is unique
among questionnaire measures in asking speciﬁcally about inner
speech, rather than more general “self-talk” (which could include
overt and covert verbalizations); (2) it covers a broad range of
phenomenological features of inner speech, with relevance to
form, function, and identity; and (3) its subscales show good
internal reliability and reasonable validity, in terms of correla-
tions with other self-report traits (such as proneness to anxiety).
We hypothesized that (1) generalized endorsements of inner
speech characteristics would be reliable indicators of inner speech
incidence recorded via random sampling, but that (2) moment-
by-moment endorsements of inner speech would, on average, be
lower than generalized endorsements of inner speech, based on
the claims of Hurlburt et al. (2013).
We also set out to explore how inner speech related to
other measures of mood and thinking identiﬁed in previous
studies on the topic. First, based on prior links between inner
speech, self-reﬂection, anxiety, and positive and negative think-
ing (D’Argembeau et al., 2011; McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough,
2011; Morin et al., 2011; Alderson-Day et al., 2014), we included
mean scores for happiness and anxiety in this analysis. Second, we
assessed relations between inner speech and temporal thinking
(i.e., whether or not participants were generally thinking about
the past, present, or future) based on the apparent involvement of
inner speech in remembering the past and planning/future think-
ing (D’Argembeau et al., 2011). If inner speech served the appar-
ent temporality-related functions reported by D’Argembeau et al.
(2011) andMorin et al. (2011), then diﬀerent characteristics of the
VISQ could be expected to be associated with temporal thinking
about the past and future.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Fifty-one university students (38 female; age M = 19.88,
SD = 2.96) were recruited via a participant-pool advertisement.
All participants had English as their ﬁrst language. Participation
was rewarded with course credit. All procedures were approved
by a local university ethics committee.
Procedure
Participants were provided with a link to download Inner Life via
an online information and consent page. Inner Life was made
available to participants for Android phones (via a private link)
or iOS (via the Testflight app-testing service). The app download
page included instructions on how to use the app and respond to
each alert. Participants were encouraged to respond to the app as
soon as it was safe to do so, and to answer based on what was
happening immediately prior to the moment they noticed the
alert.
When the app was ﬁrst opened, participants were prompted
to complete a battery of generalized questionnaire measures, tak-
ing roughly 5–10 min to complete (including the full VISQ).
Following this, Inner Life was conﬁgured to deliver two alerts a
day for 14 days (see Figure 1). Each alert contained 12–18 ques-
tions about ongoing mental phenomena, taking less than 2min to
complete. The alerts occurred at random intervals within two 3-h
windows each day, one early and one late (by default, this was set
to 9 am–12 pm and 2 pm–5 pm). Participants could choose when
their windows occurred to avoid intrusion. The only limit onwin-
dow selection was that one had to be before 2 pm, and one after
(in order to ensure a spread of responses between morning and
afternoon). On the 14th day of testing, the ﬁnal alert contained
a second general self-report battery for assessment of test–retest
reliability.
Measures
Inner Life collected a large battery of mood and psychopathology
data that are being analyzed as part of a larger ongoing study.
Here, we report the main variables associated with inner speech.
Inner Speech via General Questionnaire
The VISQ (McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough, 2011) was used to
assess phenomenological characteristics of inner speech at the
start and end of the two-week period. The VISQ is an 18-item
scale containing four subscales: Dialogic Inner Speech (Dialogic
henceforth), Evaluative/Motivational Inner Speech (Evaluative),
Other People in Inner Speech (Other People), and Condensed
Inner Speech (Condensed). Each item is answered on a 6-point
Likert scale ranging from “Certainly does not apply to me” (1) to
“Certainly applies to me” (6). Each of the subscales has very good
internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha> 0.80) and moderate/good
test–retest reliability (>0.6). Participants completed the full VISQ
on entry to the study (T1) and at the end of the study (T2).
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FIGURE 1 | Inner Life. Participants received two alerts a day (A) to answer a short battery of questions on inner speech and related topics (B). Alerts would occur
at random within two 3-hour windows, selected by the participant (C).
Inner Speech via Random Sampling
Inner speech collected via the random alerts was assessed using
four adapted items from the full VISQ.
For each subscale the highest loading item from the original
VISQ factor analysis by McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough (2011)
was selected and then reworded to refer to the current moment:
At the time of the alert:
(1) I was having a back and forth conversation in my head
(Dialogic)
(2) My thinking was shortened compared to my normal, out-loud
speech (Condensed)
(3) I was having the experience of other people’s voices (Other
People)
(4) I was evaluating my behavior using my inner speech
(Evaluative)
Each item was presented sequentially, with participants answer-
ing using the same 6-point Likert scale as the full VISQ.
Other Measures
A selection of alerts also included ratings for three other relevant
variables: happiness, anxiety, and temporal thinking.
• For happiness and anxiety participants indicated their current
mood level on a visual analog scale, from 0–10. 50% of alerts
contained happiness questions, while 75% contained anxiety
questions. Questions about each were evenly spaced through
the 14-day sampling period.
• For temporal thinking, participants were asked to indicate
whether they were thinking about the past, present, or future at
the moment of the alert. Fifty percentage of samples contained
a question about temporal thinking. Samples with a temporal
thinking question alternated each day (i.e., Day 1 contained a
question in the AM window, Day 2 in the PM window).
Analysis
As the large majority of outcome variables were non-normally
distributed, non-parametric tests were used (Spearman’s Rho and
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test). To compare generalized endorse-
ments and randomly sampled incidences of inner speech, mean
scores were calculated from the random alerts for each VISQ
factor and then scaled up to provide “total” scores. For exam-
ple, a mean score of 4 on the Dialogic item would receive
a total score of 16, based on the fact that the general VISQ
contains four items in the Dialogic subscale. Bivariate correla-
tions were used to examine reliability of T1 scores. Wilcoxon
tests were used to compare overall levels of endorsement for
inner speech characteristics. T1 and T2 general VISQ scores
were then assessed for test–retest reliability and compared for
overall score, to assess changes in reporting following use of
the app. To control for multiple comparisons for the four
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VISQ subscales, alpha was adjusted to p < 0.0125 (i.e., 0.05/4),
while p-values between 0.0125 and 0.05 were treated as trends
(see “Overall Characteristics of Inner Speech,” “Similarities and
Diﬀerences in Inner Speech,” and “Changes in Inner Speech
Following Random Sampling”). Finally, mean responses for hap-
piness, anxiety, and temporal thinking were used to explore
relations with generalized and randomly sampled inner speech.
As this ﬁnal analysis was exploratory, results were treated as sig-
niﬁcant at p < 0. 05 (see “Relations to Mood and Temporal
Thinking”).
Results
Overall Characteristics of Inner Speech
All participants provided a full set of T1 data and responded
to at least 25% of their app alerts (7/28 samples). The mean
percentage of alerts responded to was 63.14% (SD = 17.10,
Range = 29–93). The retest of general VISQ at T2 was also
completed by 36 participants (see Table 1 for mean scores on
the VISQ).
Similarities and Differences in Inner Speech
Spearman correlations between generalized endorsements of
inner speech and random sampling incident reports were signif-
icant for Condensed (r = 0.69, df = 49, p < 0.001) and Other
People (r = 0.46, df = 49, p < 0.001), but only approached sig-
niﬁcance for Dialogic, given the use of an adjusted alpha value
(r = 0.30, df = 49, p = 0.031). There was no correlation between
generalized and random scores for Evaluative (r = 0.03, df = 49,
p= 0.851).
When the total scores for inner speech were compared
across generalized endorsements and randomly sampled
reports, each of the subscales were signiﬁcantly lower when
an experience sampling method was used. As Table 1 shows,
the greatest discrepancies were for Dialogic (Wilcoxon’s
Z = −4.88, df = 50, p < 0.001) and Evaluative (Z = −5.88,
df = 51, p < 0.001), followed by Condensed (Z = −3.19,
df = 48, p < 0.001) and Other People (Z = −2.82, df = 48,
p= 0.005).
When scores were compared between subscales, T1 reports
of Evaluative inner speech were signiﬁcantly higher than scores
for Other People (Z = −5.03, df = 48, p < 0.001), Condensed
(Z = −3.54, df = 46, p < 0.001), and, at trend level, Dialogic
(Z = −2.29, df = 47, p = 0.022). This was not the case under
random sampling, where the only pairwise comparison observed
to reach signiﬁcance was between Dialogic and Other People
(12.94 vs. 10.48, respectively; Z = −2.52, df = 51, p = 0.012).
In addition, the average discrepancy between T1 and random-
sampling was greatest for Evaluative scores compared to all other
subscales (all p< 0.002).
Changes in Inner Speech Following Random
Sampling
Test–retest reliability for T1 to T2 generalized endorsements of
inner speech were signiﬁcant and within an acceptable range for
Dialogic (r = 0.81, df = 34, p < 0.001), Condensed (r = 0.88,
df = 34, p < 0.001), and Other People (r = 0.68, df = 34,
p < 0.001). Again, Evaluative was much less reliable, showing
only a modest correlation between T1 and T2 (r = 0.42, df = 34,
p= 0.011). There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in overall VISQ
scores between T1 and T2.
Relations to Mood and Temporal Thinking
No signiﬁcant correlations were observed between mean levels
of happiness and either generally endorsed or randomly sampled
VISQ scores (all r < 0.15, p > 0.30). Greater anxiety scores were
associated with Other People scores during random sampling
(r= 0.30, df = 49, p= 0.032) and, at trend level, T1 endorsements
for the same subscale (r = 0.27, df = 49, p= 0.057). Anxiety was
also associated with endorsement of Evaluative inner speech at T1
(r = 0.29, df = 49, p = 0.043) but not during random sampling
(r = 0.05, df = 49, p= 0.716). Temporal thinking (where higher
scores indicated thinking about the future and lower scores indi-
cated thinking about the past) was positively associated with
Condensed inner speech (r = 0.36, df = 49, p = 0.01) and
negatively associated with Evaluative inner speech (r = −0.32,
df = 49, p = 0.023), both at T1. However, these relations were
only observed during random sampling for Condensed inner
speech (r = 0.41, df = 49, p= 0.003).
Discussion
The main ﬁnding of the present study was that generalized
endorsements of inner speech characteristics in many cases did
not reliably indicate what is reported via random sampling, con-
trary to our hypothesis. Generalized reports of inner speech
characteristics, gathered by a validated questionnaire (the VISQ),
appeared to elicit generally higher levels of endorsement than
randomly sampled incident reports. Furthermore, and perhaps
most importantly, the correlation between generally endorsed
TABLE 1 | Endorsement of inner speech characteristics at start of the study (T1), during random sampling, and at the end of the study (T2).
T1 (n = 51) Random sampling (n = 51) T2 (n = 36)
M (SD, Range) M (SD, Range) Mean SD M (SD, Range)
Dialogic (Max 24) 17.53 (5.24, 6–24) 12.94 (4.52, 4–20.62) 1.44 16.50 (6.10, 4–24)
Evaluative (Max 24) 19.45 (3.78, 8–24) 12.06 (4.28, 4.36–21.45) 1.30 18.69 (3.96, 8–24)
Other People (Max 30) 13.75 (6.89, 5–26) 10.48 (5.99, 5–25.59) 0.96 14.28 (7.00, 5–28)
Condensed (Max 30) 15.20 (6.66, 5–29) 12.73 (6.02, 5–28.75) 0.99 14.08 (6.75, 5–27)
(i) Randomly sampled VISQ ratings could be non-integers due to averaging across samples; (ii) Mean SD reflects average standard deviation of within-subjects samples.
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and randomly sampled inner speech depended on the speciﬁc
kind of inner speech being measured: asking about evaluative
and motivational inner speech, compared to other phenomeno-
logical characteristics, did not produce consistent self-reports at
all between questionnaire and experience sampling methods of
measurement.
Participants’ general endorsements of dialog-like inner speech,
other people in inner speech, and condensed or fragmentary
inner speech showed good test–retest reliability between the start
and end of the study, and at levels that were actually higher
than in McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough’s (2011) original study.
These three subscales also showed at least some correlation with
randomly sampled levels of inner speech collected via experience
sampling, but not at the levels of reliability seen for test–retest of
the general questionnaire. At the same time, overall endorsement
levels for varieties of inner speech were signiﬁcantly lower during
random sampling, supporting Hurlburt et al.’s (2013) argument
that asking about inner speech in generalized terms may lead to
inﬂated responses.
Why over-estimation would be occurring is an important
question to answer. One thing to note is that the general VISQ
does not actually ask about frequency of inner speech: instead,
participants rate their level of agreement for what their inner
speech is generally like, whenever it occurs. As Hurlburt et al.
(2013) note, endorsement of items on this basis provides ambigu-
ous information regarding whether a given experience of inner
speech happens often, or happens infrequently but in such a
way that makes a participant strongly identify with the sce-
nario described. The random-sampling reports, in contrast, asked
about characteristics of inner speech at the moment of the alert,
even when inner speech may not have been occurring. Thus, to
some degree, reports of inner speech phenomenology are bound
to be lower whenever random sampling is used in this way.
However, even with frequency-based responding, over-
estimates of inner speech may still be expected from a gener-
alized questionnaire. Self-report questionnaires are notoriously
susceptible to various reporting biases, aﬀecting both recall of
the phenomenon in question and judgments about how often
it occurs (e.g., Houtveen and Oei, 2007; Edmondson et al.,
2013). The peak level of a behavior or experience, its level
at the end of sampling, and its variability across time can
all aﬀect participant accuracy: for instance, participants with
more variable chronic pain also tend to overestimate their aver-
age pain level compared to those with more consistent pain
(Stone et al., 2005).
Consideration of such biases is important for interpreting the
results regarding evaluative inner speech. While the other three
subscales of the VISQ showed at least some evidence of relia-
bility between the general questionnaire and random sampling,
estimates of evaluative and motivational characteristics of inner
speech were worryingly divergent. Generalized reports for this
factor were not signiﬁcantly related to random-sampling levels
and showed relatively low test–retest reliability for the subsample
who completed the VISQ again at the end of the study. This is in
distinct contrast with McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough’s (2011)
data, in which general scores for evaluative inner speech showed
high test–retest reliability (0.80). Correspondingly, correlations
with mood and temporal thinking observed for this charac-
teristic did not hold across generalized and randomly sampled
measurements.
Here and in prior studies (McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough,
2011; Alderson-Day et al., 2014), evaluative inner speech was the
VISQ subscale that participants endorsed the most, and was the
most likely to be over-estimated. Given prior evidence of variabil-
ity eﬀects (e.g., Stone et al., 2005), it could be that evaluative inner
speech is harder to estimate because of its variance across time
compared to other subscales. However, themean SDs of each sub-
scale do not support this idea (see Table 1): Dialogic inner speech
was the most variable subscale, rather than Evaluative.
A second reporting bias could arise from the content of eval-
uative inner speech. Strongly valenced behaviors and states have
often been reported to aﬀect accuracy of recall (Shiﬀman et al.,
2008). On both the VISQ (Alderson-Day et al., 2014) and other
measures of inner speech (Brinthaupt et al., 2009), the tendency
to engage in self-reﬂective and evaluative processes appears to
be linked to negative beliefs and ideas about oneself. If so, eval-
uative inner speech, compared to other VISQ subscales, may
have a greater salience to participants when they think about it
in generalized terms, leading to its overestimation on question-
naires. Were this to be the case, discrepancies in inner speech
reporting would be expected to be greatest for measures that
speciﬁcally enquire about positive and negative statements in
inner speech (such as the Self-Talk Inventory; Calvete et al., 2005),
or in individuals with a tendency toward engaging in more neg-
ative, ruminative inner speech behaviors (such as people with
depression; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004).
Exploratory analysis of the relations between inner speech,
mood, and temporal thinking indicated two avenues for future
study. First, the presence of other people in inner speech—
assessed via random sampling—was also associated with greater
levels of momentary anxiety. This is consistent with this factor
being a general marker for psychopathology, as it has previously
been observed to relate to increased trait anxiety, hallucination-
proneness, and dissociative tendencies (McCarthy-Jones and
Fernyhough, 2011; Alderson-Day et al., 2014). This was also evi-
dent for generalized endorsement of other people in inner speech,
but only at trend level, suggesting again that random sampling
could provide a more accurate assessment of this particular char-
acteristic. Second, higher levels of condensed inner speech (via
generalized endorsement and randomly sampled reports) were
associated with thinking about the future rather than the past.
This is in line with links between inner speech and future think-
ing observed by D’Argembeau et al. (2011), but suggests that the
kind of inner speech being usedmay diﬀer depending on whether
someone is thinking about the past, present, or the future.
Condensed inner speech is proposed by Fernyhough (2004) to
represent a syntactically and semantically abbreviated form of
verbal thinking that results from the internalization of external
speech. Its counterpart is expanded inner speech, in which inter-
nal talk involves full words and sentences. Speculatively, it is
possible that condensed thinking could aid future planning, while
more expanded inner speech could be involved in reﬂecting on
the past and speciﬁc recall, including reconstructing past events
in the greater detail aﬀorded by an expanded linguistic code.
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In contrast, no associations were observed between happiness rat-
ings and VISQ scores. This is inconsistent with D’Argembeau
et al.’s (2011) ﬁnding that inner speech diary reports were
more likely to be associated with negative rather than posi-
tive thinking, suggesting again that generalized endorsements
about inner speech do not show consistent evidence of valid-
ity. Happiness has previously been negatively associated with
mind-wandering reports collected via experience sampling
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010), suggesting that attentional
control factors may be more important factors for understand-
ing mood variation than the presence or absence of inner
speech.
Some limitations to this study must be acknowledged. First,
only one measure of inner speech —the VISQ—was used here,
and it is possible that the discrepancy between inner speech
reports observed is an artifact of this speciﬁc scale rather than
inner speech measures more generally. Given the limited valid-
ity of other major scales (Uttl et al., 2011), it is not clear that
alternative measures would necessarily have performed better.
However, the VISQ could deﬁnitely be improved: as noted above,
the present version of the scale asks participants to answer based
on their agreement with general statements rather than speciﬁ-
cally indicating frequency. To fully test why incidence estimates
of inner speech diﬀer so much between, for example, the stud-
ies of Klinger and Cox (1987) and Heavey and Hurlburt (2008)
requires an index of inner speech that also asks about the fre-
quency of particular experiences. We are currently in the process
of adapting and expanding the VISQ for this purpose, which
should remove some of the ambiguity in participants’ responses
noted by Hurlburt et al. (2013), and may lead to more accurate
generalized data.
Second, for clarity of examining relations between generalized
and randomly sampled inner speech, responses to momentary
samples were averaged in the present study to provide mean
scores. This, however, undoubtedly obscures the level of com-
plexity inherent in experience sampling data. A key question for
inner speech research is how it may vary across time in relation
to mood and activity factors; further analysis with a larger sam-
ple will allow this to be assessed. Third, as is the case for the
large majority of recent studies on inner speech, the data col-
lected here are limited to an undergraduate student sample and
do not necessarily reﬂect inner speech characteristics in the gen-
eral population. The use of research apps like Inner Life should
allow researchers to go beyond university-based samples and
obtain a more accurate picture of the heterogeneity of inner
speech.
Finally, it is important to note that any self-report method,
whether gathered by questionnaire or momentary assessment,
may be aﬀected by reporting bias. A method such as DES
diﬀers from standard self-report techniques and most other
experience sampling methods in its attempt to bracket exper-
imenters’ presuppositions and iteratively train participants to
avoid their own. Hurlburt et al. (2013) argue that any self-report
method is likely to provide inaccurate data on inner experi-
ence unless it attempts to do something similar. Notwithstanding
the importance of such considerations, we argue here and else-
where (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2014) that a combina-
tion of methods is needed to examine inner speech both on
an in-depth, individual level (as in DES) and in larger, repre-
sentative samples. Examining how data from self-reports may
change in their reliability and validity with iterative training is
also important for establishing whether people can ‘improve’ in
their reporting of inner experience, as DES would hold, although
in the present dataset, there were no clear signs of reactiv-
ity in response to use of random sampling (cf. Runyan et al.,
2013).
In summary, the present article describes the ﬁrst app-based
study of everyday inner speech. Generalized estimates of inner
speech can in some cases be reliable indicators of day-to-day char-
acteristics of inner speech, but this varies considerably depending
on the kind of self-talk being asked about. It seems likely that
memory biases and other confounds aﬀect self-reports about
inner speech, particularly for its evaluative and motivational fea-
tures. This does not mean that self-reports of inner speech are
entirely inaccurate, but it strongly suggests that when we ask
about inner speech, participants are reporting on the kinds of
subjective experiences and processes that are salient and impor-
tant to them.
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